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ABSTRACT
Common intuition and experimental psychology suggest that the ability to self-regulate, willpower,
is a depletable resource. We investigate the behavior of an agent who optimally consumes a cake (or
paycheck or workload) over time and who recognizes that restraining his consumption too much
would exhaust his willpower and leave him unable to manage his consumption. Unlike prior models
of self-control, a model with willpower depletion can explain the increasing consumption sequences
observable in high frequency data (and corresponding laboratory findings), the apparent links
between unrelated self-control behaviors, and the altered economic behavior following imposition
of cognitive loads. At the same time, willpower depletion provides an alternative explanation for a
taste for commitment, intertemporal preference reversals, and procrastination. Accounting for
willpower depletion thus provides a more unified theory of time preference. It also provides an
explanation for anomalous intratemporal behaviors such as low correlations between health-related
activities.
Dan Silverman
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Patterns of intertemporal choice that are common but inconsistent with standard models have
inspired a growing literature on the economics of self-control. The human tendencies to seek
self-commitment, to seize small immediate rewards despite their important future costs, and to
procrastinate have motivated a number of studies of quasi-hyperbolic time discounting (e.g., Laibson
1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), temptation costs (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer 2001, 2004), and
conﬂicts between “dual selves” (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1988; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006). Such
models of self control are consistent with a great deal of experimental evidence, and have been
fruitfully applied to a number of economic problems ranging from portfolio choice to labor supply
to health investment.
While capturing important aspects of both experimental and ﬁeld data, these economic models
of self control cannot explain three other “anomalous” features of intertemporal choices: (1) people
behave diﬀerently if they ﬁrst engage in cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. pilots making a second
demanding landing of the day are known to be more prone to accident; see Wald, 2006); (2) agents
sometimes exhibit negative time preference (e.g. they consume at an increasing rate, “save the
best for last” when consuming and “get the hard part out of the way ” when working); (3) people
sometimes behave as if completely unrelated activities requiring self-control are linked (e.g. they
do not resist smoking or overeating when trying to quit drinking or when starting a new exercise
regime).
In this paper, we present a tractable model of self control that explains each of these three
anomalies. At the same time, our model provides an alternative explanation for prominent anoma-
lies addressed by prior models of self-control. We accomplish this by taking into account a single
cognitive constraint that is both intuitively appealing and consistent with a large literature in
experimental psychology: exerting self control depletes a fungible but scarce cognitive resource,
“willpower.”
Anecdotes consistent with the notion of depletable willpower are common. Many who resist
unhealthy foods and fruitless websurﬁng all day and who might prefer to go to bed early after a light
dinner ﬁnd themselves at the end of the day gorging on junk food and unable to stop watching
television. More generally, dieters can often maintain their discipline for short periods but ﬁnd
such self-restraint unsustainable over the long term. Proﬂigate spending or drinking to excess is
frequently the “reward” for a hard week at work.
Experimental psychology (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister and Vohs, 2003) has gone beyond
these anecdotes and has demonstrated in a variety of settings that individuals depleted by prior acts
of self-restraint later behave as though they have less capacity for self-control. The experiments
1in this literature typically have two phases. Every subject in the experiment participates in the
second phase but only a subset, randomly selected, participates in the ﬁrst; the remainder is used
as the control group. In the ﬁrst phase, subjects are asked to perform a task that is meant to
deplete their willpower; in the second phase, their endurance in an entirely unrelated activity also
requiring self control is measured.1 Subjects who participated in the ﬁrst phase display substantially
less endurance in the second phase. This apparent link between the exercise of self-control in
one activity and later self-discipline in another activity has been observed repeatedly, with many
diﬀerent manipulations and measures of self-regulation (Baumeister and Vohs, 2003, Vohs and
Faber, 2004). Two recent experiments (Vohs and Faber, 2004 and Dewitte et al., 2005) show
that willpower depletion and prior cognitive loads aﬀect subsequent economic behavior.2 While
individual experiments have weaknesses and leave open questions about the nature of willpower
depletion and its empirical relevance, we regard the collection of these experimental ﬁndings as
reinforcing the intuitive notion of willpower as a depletable cognitive resource.
In this paper, we study the eﬀects of incorporating willpower depletion in the simplest model
of intertemporal decision-making: the canonical cake-eating problem. In our formulation, mod-
erating consumption requires willpower; the greater restraint the consumer exercises, the faster
his willpower erodes. In addition, consistent both with introspection and experimenter observa-
tion (Baumeister et al., 1994), we assume that a given level of consumption depletes willpower at
a (weakly) faster rate when a person’s reserves of willpower are lower. Finally, we assume that
consuming nothing requires no self-restraint when no cake remains.
Ours is the ﬁrst formal model in the economics literatu r et ot a k ee x p l i c i ta c c o u n to fw i l l p o w e r
depletion. Because we do so in a simple and familiar economic environment, we are able to clarify
what phenomena willpower depletion can explain.
Willpower depletion provides an alternative explanation for a preference for commitment, ap-
1For example, in the ﬁrst phase subjects have been asked not to eat tempting foods, not to drink liquids when
thirsty, or to take a so-called “Stroop test.” In each round of such a test, the name of a color (e.g. “green”) is written
in ink of a diﬀerent color and the respondent is asked to report the color of the ink. A respondent’s accuracy and
speed at the test is thought to depend on his ability to “inhibit” or control his “automatic” response which is to read
the word rather than identify the color of the ink in which it is written.
2In Vohs and Faber (2004), subjects who were willpower-depleted purchased a wider assortment of merchandise and
spent a larger portion of their experimental earnings than the control group. The experiments of Dewitte et al. should
be distinguished from prior cognitive-load experiments that showed the eﬀects of such loads on contemporaneous
intertemporal choices. In these earlier studies, respondents were more likely to choose cake over fruit (Shiv and
Fedorikin, 1999) or a smaller earlier reward over a larger later one (Hinson, et al. 2003) when simultaneously asked to
perform a memory task. In contrast, Dewitte et al. (2005) f o u n dt h a te v e nw h e ns u c hm e m o r yt a s k sw e r ep e r f o r m e d
prior to the consumption decision, they aﬀected the choice of how much candy to eat.
2parent time-inconsistencies, and profound procrastination–the hallmarks of self-control models in-
cluding temptation cost, dual-selves, and hyperbolic discounting. As in prior models of self-control,
an agent in our model would strictly prefer to have his “cake” or paycheck doled out to him by a
savings club. For if the entire amount were available, resisting spending it would deplete his scarce
willpower. Optimal behavior when willpower is depletable also provides an alternative explanation
for apparent intertemporal preference reversals.3 When asked to choose between a smaller (con-
sumption) reward that will arrive immediately and a larger one that would arrive after some delay,
an agent with limited willpower may choose the former. The willpower cost (measured in utility
terms) of resisting the immediate, smaller reward may outweigh the utility gain from receiving the
later, larger reward. However, if asked to choose now one of these same two options set oﬀ in the
temporal distance, the consumer may choose the later, larger prize. The choice now of a prize to be
delivered in the future enables the consumer to commit irreversibly to an option. He then prefers
the later, larger prize since willpower ceases to be required to resist the earlier, smaller prize. A
willpower-constrained agent may therefore appear to behave in a time-inconsistent manner. Opti-
mal behavior in our model also provides an alternative explanation for procrastination. Suppose
the agent must expend a ﬁxed amount of time to complete an assignment before a certain deadline,
but can allocate the remaining leisure time optimally.4 If the agent is willpower constrained, he
may enjoy leisure early in the program, and then work non-stop until the deadline. While doing
marginally more work early on and enjoying marginally more leisure later would strictly increase
his utility, he lacks the willpower to implement this alternative program. Working harder in the
ﬁrst phase would require more willpower but so would restraining himself from squandering the
positive stock of leisure he would carry into the second phase.
Our model also explains anomalies inconsistent with other models of self-control. Prior cog-
nitive loads aﬀect the subsequent path of consumption by reducing the initial stock of willpower.
Moreover, an agent in our model may increase his consumption over time because exercising self
control later, when his stock of willpower is reduced, may require more willpower than exercising the
same self control earlier. Our model also explains linkages between seemingly unrelated activities,
s i n c et h es a m ec o g n i t i v er e s o u r c ei su s e dt oe x e r c i s es e l fc o n t r o li nd i ﬀerent activities.
3While experimental evidence consistent with declining rates of time discount is extensive, it should be noted that
the interpretation of these experiments as supporting (quasi-) hyperbolic discounting is not uncontroversial. See, e.g.,
Rubinstein (2003), Read (2003), and Benhabib, et al.(2006), for alternative interpretations.
4This is exactly the setup Fischer (2001) used to investigate procrastination but we have introduced a willpower
depletion constraint. Without it, Fischer ﬁnds that the discount factor required to explain procrastination in a
model where geometrically-discounted, additively-separable utility is maximized is unrealistic; our model generates
procrastination (zero consumption of leisure for the ﬁnal phase of the planning horizon) for any discount rate.
3This linkage has important implications for consumption behavior. One might anticipate that
perfect smoothing of consumption would always occur if the agent had suﬃcient willpower. While
this result always holds in our model if restraining consumption is the only use of willpower, it almost
never obtains if willpower has alternative uses. Suppose that willpower can be used to implement
intertemporal saving (cake-eating) as well as some other activities (e.g. cramming for exams,
training for musical performances, maintaining a diet, or preparing an important presentation) that
require self-discipline. We show that the optimal allocation almost never results in consumption
smoothing over the entire horizon, even when it is feasible. Intuitively, consumption smoothing
over the ﬁnite horizon is optimal only if there is so much willpower that allocating any more toward
regulating this intertemporal activity would not increase the utility which can be achieved from it.
But allocating so much willpower to the intertemporal consumption can never be optimal provided
that redirecting more toward some other activity will strictly increase the utility obtained in that
activity.
In reality, there are always alternative uses of willpower, and our formal analysis of this case
yields some surprising implications. Behavioral diﬀerences between rich and poor people sometimes
attributed to diﬀerences in self-control skills may reﬂect wealth diﬀerences and nothing more.
Consider how two agents, who diﬀer only in the size of their initial cakes (interpreted as stocks
of either wealth or leisure), would choose to consume in the ﬁrst phase if they recognize that
utility from the alternative activity depends on the amount of willpower that is left over for that
activity. Assume they have the same initial willpower, the same self-control technology, and the
same preferences. We provide an example where the rich agent chooses to smooth his consumption
more than his poorer counterpart even though the richer agent invests more of his willpower in
alternative activities such as market work or exercise regimes. We thus illustrate how the poor
may appear to exert less self-discipline (have lower rates of saving, higher rates of obesity), not
because they have diﬀerent preferences, willpower endowments or self-discipline technology but
merely because they have fewer material resources.5
The linkage between activities depleting a common cognitive resource may explain other be-
haviors besides the intertemporal ones on which we have focussed. To emphasize this, we conclude
by showing how willpower scarcity can explain an intratemporal puzzle as well. The standard
5Allowing willpower to have alternative uses has other implications. For example, using the typical two-stage
protocol, Muraven (1998) ﬁnds that a given ﬁrst-stage depletion activity has less of an eﬀect on second stage self-
control when subjects are paid more for exerting that latter control. This ﬁnding is consistent with a model where
willpower has alternative uses. If we ﬁx the marginal value of willpower remaining after the experiment, and increase
the incentive for exerting self-control in the second phase activity, then the agent will optimally reallocate willpower
to that second phase self-control activity and leave less in reserve for self-regulation after the experiment.
4health investment model predicts that agents who place a relatively high value on life should si-
multaneously control more tightly all activities adversely aﬀecting health (drinking, smoking, etc.).
But Cutler and Glaeser (2005) point out that the correlation between such activities is in fact
extremely small. Moreover, they show that in the standard model the only way this correlation can
be low is if there is little variation in both time discounting and the value of life in the population,
which seems implausible. However, people with scarce willpower may ﬁnd tightening control of
two health-related activities at the same time impossible (or suboptimal).6 We show that if the
population consists of a mixture of people with diﬀerent values of life and endowments of willpower,
the optimal allocation of self-control can explain the observed negligible correlation between two
health-related activities despite a large variance in the value of life.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we present our model and interpret its ﬁrst-order
conditions. In section 3 we describe qualitative properties of the optimal consumption program
with and without an alternative use for willpower. In section 4 we argue that a theory of depletable
willpower oﬀers a more uniﬁed theory of time preference and discuss the advantages of our for-
mulation over existing models of self-control. That discussion includes a summary of evidence of
increasing consumption paths from high frequency ﬁeld data. In section 5 we discuss two extensions
of our intertemporal model: ﬁrst, to the case where the exercise of self control depletes willpower
over the short term but builds it over the longer term and, second, to the case where an individual
is uncertain about the size of his willpower stock. In section 6 we explain how the anomalous low
correlation in health-related activities discovered by Cutler and Glaeser (2005) may be attributable
to variation in the willpower endowments in the population. In section 7 we conclude.
2 Consumption with Limited Willpower
In the canonical cake-eating problem in continuous time, a consumer maximizes his discounted
utility by choosing his consumption path c(t) over a ﬁxed horizon (t ∈ [0,T]). We denote the size
o ft h ec a k ea tt i m et as R(t) and assume that R(0) is given. The rate of decline in the cake at t
(denoted − ˙ R(t)) is, therefore, c(t).
We depart from the canonical model by assuming that the agent is endowed with a given stock of
willpower W(0) and depletes it when he restrains his consumption. We denote the rate of willpower
6The diﬃculty of controlling multiple health-related activities is also recognized by health professionals. For
example American Diabetes Association gives the following helpful advice: “Pick some changes that you want to
do the most, and that will make the biggest impact. Perhaps choose one change in your eating habits and an-
other in activity. Remember; don’t try to change everything at once.” See, http://www.diabetes.org/weightloss-and-
exercise/weightloss-small-steps.jspS
5depletion as f(W(t),c(t)). Allowing the rate of depletion to depend not merely on the level of self
restraint but on the remaining willpower reserves captures the experimental observation that the
same restraint depletes willpower at a faster rate when one’s willpower reserves are lower. Because
neither experiments nor introspection suggests the sign of the relationship, we assume that f (·) is
not aﬀected by the stock of cake remaining (R(t)), provided some remains.7
An important feature of willpower depletion is that as long as even a morsel of cake remains,
one has to use willpower to consume nothing; but consuming nothing requires no willpower when
there is nothing left to eat. We refer to this feature as the “fundamental discontinuity of willpower
depletion” and take account of it in our formulation.8
In anticipation of the analysis in Section 3, we assume that any willpower remaining after the
conclusion of intertemporal consumption is used in an alternative activity and generates additional
utility m(·).
Since the agent is not permitted to choose a consumption path which results in negative
willpower, the willpower constraint may preclude the path which exhausts the cake while equal-
izing discounted marginal utility up through T. We refer to that path, which is the hallmark of
the canonical model, as “perfect smoothing.” Even when perfect smoothing is feasible, the agent
may choose to forgo it. Our goal throughout is to investigate how the presence of the willpower
constraint alters the agent’s chosen consumption plan relative to the predictions of the canonical
model.
2.1 Formulation of the Model
















−f (W (t),c(t)) if R(t) > 0
0,o t h e r w i s e
R(T) ≥ 0,W(T) ≥ 0
R(0) = R ≥ 0
W (0) = W ≥ 0,
7Assuming f (·) is not a function of R(t) simpliﬁes our analysis. If, however, f were increasing (decreasing) in
R(t), we conjecture that this would mitigate (reinforce) the agent’s incentive to increase consumption over time.
8This discontinuity would persist even if f (·) were a function of R(t) so long as lim
R(t)→0
f (·) > 0. While it would
simplify our analysis if the discontinuity conveniently disappeared, there is no reason to expect that it does.
6where ρ is the subjective rate of time discount and t0 =s u p{t ∈ [0,T]:R(t) > 0}.N o t et h a tt h e
law of motion for willpower is discontinuous reﬂecting the fundamental discontinuity of willpower
depletion discussed above.
We make the following assumptions on the willpower technology f and the utility function U.
We assume that, for all W, f (W,c) > 0 for c ∈ [0,¯ c) and f (W,c)=0for c ∈ [¯ c,∞) for some ¯ c>0.
While following a given consumption path, if the willpower stock becomes zero before exogenous
time T, consumption must weakly exceed ¯ c thereafter until the cake is depleted. Therefore, this
assumption guarantees that the set of feasible consumption paths is nonempty. We assume that
f is twice diﬀerentiable everywhere except at ¯ c and continuous at ¯ c. We assume that f is strictly
decreasing (fc < 0) and weakly convex (fcc ≥ 0)i nc for c ∈ [0,¯ c) and weakly decreasing (fW ≤ 0)
in W. As for cross eﬀects, we assume that fcW ≥ 0. Thus, we assume that the more the agent
restrains his consumption, the faster he depletes his willpower reserves; moreover, the same level
of restraint may result in faster depletion of willpower if the agent’s reserves of willpower are
lower. We assume U (0) = 09,U(c) is diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. We
are interested in modeling non-addictive behaviors like those considered in the experiments by
Baumeister and colleagues; so U (c) is a function only of contemporaneous consumption, and not
past consumption.10
This problem, though simple in its formulation, is non-standard since the law of motion for
one state variable has a discontinuity at the point where the other state variable equals zero. We
solve this nonstandard problem by examining the solution to a related problem (P2 below) which
is established in Appendix A to have the same solution. In P2, the agent chooses both an optimal
consumption path c(t) and the date s ≤ T after which consumption ceases, where ˙ W = c(t)=0
9As long as U (0) > −∞, we can always renormalize the utility function U so that U (0) = 0.
10There is a related literature (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Laibson 2001) concerning self-regulation when the
good consumed is addictive, or preferences are state-dependent. In these models self-control is perfect in a cool state
but absent in a hot state. By changing current consumption, the agent may alter the probability that he enters
the hot state, thereby indirectly exerting future self control. While these models explain important issues regarding
consumption of addictive goods, they do not adress essential features of willpower depletion. For example they do not
explain consumption behavior for non-addictive goods, and in particular the eﬀect of cognitive loads on consumption,
and do not link behavior across seemingly unrelated activities.









W (t)=−f (W (t),c(t))
R(s) ≥ 0,W(s) ≥ 0
R(0) = R ≥ 0
W (0) = W ≥ 0.
The Hamiltonian for problem (P2)i sg i v e nb y
H (c(t),R(t),W(t),t,α(t),λ(t)) = e−ρtU (c(t)) − α(t)c(t) − λ(t)f (W (t),c(t)).
To reduce notation, we shall refer to this Hamiltonian as H (t) when no confusion arises. The
ﬁrst-order conditions are:
c(t) ≥ 0, e−ρtU0 (c(t)) − α(t) − λ(t)fc ≤ 0 and c.s. (1)
˙ W (t)=−f (2)
˙ α(t)=0 (3)
˙ λ(t)=λ(t)fW (4)
T − s ≥ 0,H (s) − ρe−ρsm(W (s)) ≥ 0 and c.s. (5)
R(s) ≥ 0,α (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (6)
W (s) ≥ 0,λ (s) − m0 (W (s)) ≥ 0 and c.s. (7)
It should be noted for future use that, whenever willpower is strictly positive, consumption
varies continuously with time. This result follows because (1) the Hamiltonian is strictly concave
in c; (2) α and λ vary continuously with time when W (t) > 0;( 3 )U0 is continuous in c;( 4 )fc is
continuous in both c and W;a n d( 5 )W varies continuously with time.











Grouped in this way, condition (1) implies that consuming at a slightly faster rate at time t
generates two marginal beneﬁts and one marginal cost. The direct marginal beneﬁt( e−ρtU0 (c(t)))
i st h ei n c r e a s ei nu t i l i t ya tt i m et (expressed in utils at t =0 )that results from consuming more
8then. Increasing consumption also has an indirect marginal beneﬁt( −fcλ(t)) since willpower is
depleted at a slower rate (−fc) and each unit of willpower saved at time t is worth λ(t) .T h e
marginal cost of consuming at a faster rate at t (α(t)) is the utility lost because the additional cake
consumed at t can no longer be consumed at another time. At an interior optimum (c(t) > 0), the
sum of the two marginal beneﬁts equals the marginal cost (all expressed in utils at a common time,
t =0 ) .
The conditions (3) and (4) highlight an important conceptual distinction between the two
depletable resources in the model. Additional cake is equally valuable whenever it arrives since its
availability before it is depleted provides no services and its future arrival can be fully anticipated
by drawing down reserves faster in advance. Thate x p l a i n sw h yt h ei m p u t e dv a l u eo fa d d i t i o n a l
cake is constant over time ( ˙ α(t)=0from (3)). In contrast, when fW < 0 and the willpower
constraint is binding, additional willpower is more valuable the earlier it arrives because its mere
presence provides a service: the more willpower one has available at t, the less must be depleted
over a short interval to restrain consumption by a given amount. This is not a service upon which
one can draw merely by recognizing that one will have more willpower in the future. For this
reason, the imputed value of willpower declines over time (˙ λ(t) < 0 from (4) whenever fW < 0). Of
course, this distinction between the two depletable resources disappears in the special case where
fW =0 . In that case, additional willpower–like additional cake–is equally valuable whenever it
arrives.
We are now in a position to explain intuitively how consumption changes over time. To isolate
the new eﬀects arising in our model, we assume that ρ =0 . Since the marginal cost of increased
consumption never varies over time ( ˙ α(t)=0 ), the sum of the direct and indirect marginal beneﬁt
of increased consumption can never vary over time: whenever the direct marginal beneﬁtp a t hi s
increasing the indirect marginal beneﬁt path must be decreasing at the same rate (and vice versa).
Since utility is stationary and subject to diminishing returns, an increasing consumption path must
always result in a decreasing direct marginal beneﬁt path. Hence, an increasing consumption path
must be accompanied by an increasing indirect marginal beneﬁt path. By a similar argument, a
decreasing consumption path must be accompanied by a decreasing indirect marginal beneﬁtp a t h .
In short, sign ˙ c(t)=s i g nd
dt(λ(t))(−fc).
Consumption can be constant over time if and only if the indirect marginal beneﬁtp a t hi s
constant over time. This can occur for any of three distinct reasons: (1) willpower has no value
(λ(t)=0 ) ; (2) willpower, although valuable, provides no services (fW =0 ) , resulting in a constant
imputed value of willpower and the same reduction in the speed of willpower depletion when
consumption expands regardless of the size of the stock of willpower remaining (neither fc nor
λ(t) changes with time); and (3) the willpower released by increased consumption just happens to
9increase over time by exactly what is required to oﬀset the concurrent decrease in the utility value
of each unit of released willpower (−λ(t)fc is constant).
More formally, suppose ρ =0and c(t) > 0 for t ≤ s. Condition (1) implies
U00 (c) ˙ c − [˙ λfc + λfcc˙ c + λfcW ˙ W]= ˙ α
U00 (c) ˙ c − [λfWfc + λfcc˙ c − λfcWf]=0
⇐⇒
˙ c = λ(t)
fWfc − fcWf
U00 (c) − λ(t)fcc
. (8)
Given our curvature assumptions (U strictly concave and f weakly convex in c), the denominator
of the right-hand side of equation (8) is strictly negative. So if the willpower constraint does not
bind (λ(t)=0 ) , equation (8) implies that consumption is constant. On the other hand, if λ(t) > 0,
then when c(t) > 0, ˙ c T 0 as (fcWf − fWfc) T 0.
Increasing consumption paths must emerge in our model whenever the indirect marginal beneﬁt
path increases over time. To illustrate how this surprising phenomenon can arise, consider the
following simple example of a willpower depletion function f:
f = A + K (W)g (c) with K0 ≤ 0 and g0 < 0.
In this simple example, a given act of will is more depleting when the agent is already depleted,






sign(˙ c)=s i g n
¡
−K0gKg0 + K0g0 (A + Kg)
¢





Since g is strictly decreasing and K is weakly decreasing, there are two possibilities. At any t
where c(t) > 0, ˙ c =0if K0 =0 .B u ti fK0 < 0 then ˙ c T 0 as A T 0. So whenever the willpower
constraint is binding, K0 < 0,a n dA>0, the path of optimal consumption must increase over
time. The increasing path emerges for two reasons. First, because A is positive, willpower would
be disappearing as time elapses; this is a “use it or lose it” situation. The basic incentive that
10this depletion gives for using willpower earlier is magniﬁed by the fact that K0 is negative; a given
act of will is more depleting when the willpower stock is low. So the agent optimally takes the
opportunity to exert acts of will when they have a relatively low opportunity cost (when W is
large) and before time erodes the willpower stock. Thus consumption grows in that case because
the indirect marginal beneﬁt of increased consumption grows over time.
3 Optimal Consumption When Willpower Has Alternative Uses
Intuitively, willpower has many uses besides the regulation of intertemporal consumption and if
the agent anticipates these uses their existence will aﬀect his consumption proﬁle. Muraven (1998)
demonstrated in the laboratory that subjects do alter their behavior in anticipation of future uses
of willpower. When subjects appear to have nearly exhausted their willpower, they may in fact
be holding willpower in reserve for future activities. In one experiment (Muraven, 1998), some
subjects were given two tasks to be performed consecutively and some were told in advance that a
third task would follow the ﬁrst two. When performing the second task, those who anticipated the
t h i r dt a s kg a v eu ps o o n e r .
If an agent lacks any alternative use of willpower, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for him
to consume at a constant rate over the entire horizon (“perfect smoothing” for short) is that he
have enough willpower initially for smoothing to be feasible. If willpower has alternative uses,
however, he may refrain from perfect smoothing no matter how large his initial stock of willpower.
In this section we derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for perfect smoothing to occur with
and without alternative uses of willpower.
3.1 The Benchmark Case
As a benchmark, we consider ﬁrst the case where willpower has no alternative uses (m(W) ≡ 0).
When willpower can only be used to regulate intertemporal consumption, perfect smoothing is
optimal whenever feasible. Intuitively, since there is no shortage of willpower, there is no marginal
v a l u et oh a v i n gm o r eo fi t(λ(t)=0for t ≥ 0) and characteristics of the willpower technology do
not induce time-varying consumption.
In the absence of discounting, perfect smoothing implies that consumption is constant over
time for t ∈ [0,T]. More generally, Proposition 1 describes the qualitative properties of the optimal
consumption path when ρ = m(W)=0 .
Proposition 1 Let WH be the minimum level of initial willpower such that setting c(t)=R
T for
t ∈ [0,T] is feasible. Denote the optimal consumption path as c∗ (t).I f W ≥ WH then the cake
11is exhausted, and c∗ (t)=R
T for t ∈ [0,T]. If W<W H then both the cake and willpower are
exhausted (R(s)=W (s)=0 ) , and when consumption is strictly positive it is strictly increasing
(resp. constant, strictly decreasing) if and only if fcWf − fWfc is strictly positive (resp. zero,
strictly negative).
Proof. From (3) α(t) is a constant function, and with a slight abuse of notation we denote this
constant as α ≥ 0.
First assume W ≥ WH. C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eλ(t)=0for all t ∈ [0,s]. Since U0 (·) > 0,
(1) requires α>0 and c(t) constant. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote this constant
as c ≥ 0. Since α>0, (6) requires R(s)=0 . Since R(0) = R>0, then c>0. From (5),
T −s ≥ 0.I fT −s>0, (5) would require U (c)− U0 (c)c =0 . But since U0 (·) > 0,U00 (·) < 0, and
c>0,U (c) − U0(c)c>0; hence, T − s>0 must be ruled out. It follows that when λ(t)=0for
all t ∈ [0,s], then s = T and c = R
T . By deﬁnition of WH,W(T) ≥ 0. Thus (7) is satisﬁed. This
proves the ﬁrst statement in the proposition.
Now assume W<W H. Then λ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,s], for suppose to the contrary that λ(t)=0






n=0 fW(W(n),c(n))dn > 0 for all t, λ(t)=0for some t ∈ [0,s], implies that λ(t)=0for all
t ∈ [0,s]. But as seen above the conditions above then imply that c = R
T which is infeasible when
W<W H. So if W<W H then λ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,s], and by (7) W (s)=0 . To satisfy (1)
with U0 (·) > 0 and −λfc > 0 requires α>0; and, again, since α>0, (6) requires that the cake is
entirely consumed (R(s)=0 ). In this case, by our earlier observations, (fcWf − fWfc) T 0 for all
t ∈ [0,s] i fa n do n l yi f˙ c T 0 for all t where c(t) > 0. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Note that, when W<W H, Proposition 1 describes the rate of change in optimal consumption
when consumption is strictly positive. This description does not, however, preclude intervals of zero
consumption. Consider the example presented at the end of section 2.1 where f = A+K (W)g (c)
with K0 ≤ 0 and g0 < 0. Recall that, when W<W H and consumption is strictly positive, the rate
of change in consumption takes the sign of A. Indeed, consumption is strictly positive for t ∈ [0,s],
but the last moment of positive consumption (s) may occur before T. In that case, the optimal
path has c(t)=0for t ∈ (s,T]. Thus, in this example, the agent may (if the good is leisure and A
is positive) work relatively hard on a project at the beginning, slack oﬀ as time goes by, but then
cram for some interval just before the deadline. This optimal cramming just before the deadline
reﬂects a basic tension between the willpower and cake (leisure) budgets. The extra leisure needed
to stretch positive consumption a bit longer at the end implies harder work earlier in the program,
12and thus less willpower left over at the end. The increased consumption at the end does not reduce
willpower depletion then since before, when no cake remained, no willpower was being depleted.
Once the worker frees up time to enjoy leisure in the ﬁnal phase, exercising restraint increases
willpower depletion in that phase as well. At the optimum, therefore, smoothing the time spent
working is either infeasible or implies such a distortion of the previous path (perhaps from complete
slacking as willpower is depleted) as to lower utility.
3.2 Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Perfect Smoothing When Willpower
Has Alternative Uses
Having characterized how the consumer would behave if willpower had no other uses, we now
turn to the more relevant case where the agent anticipates needing the remaining willpower to
regulate other urges. We denote the maximized expected utility derived from these alternative uses
of willpower by the bequest function, m(·) > 0, which we assume is strictly increasing and weakly
concave. Denote perfectly smooth consumption as cH =
¯ R
T . When willpower has alternative uses,
perfect smoothing may be eschewed even when feasible. We assume throughout the remainder of
this section that perfect smoothing is feasible: W>W H.T o i s o l a t e t h e i n ﬂuence of willpower
concerns we will continue to assume ρ =0 .
Denote by ˆ W the willpower available at T if perfect smoothing (cH) has been implemented;
clearly ˆ W depends on the initial levels of willpower and cake ( ¯ W, ¯ R) but we suppress this dependence
for simplicity. If perfect smoothing has been implemented, ﬁrst-order condition (1) implies that




= α. Multiplying both sides by cH we get,
h




cH = αcH. (9)




≥ 0. Substituting (9) into (5), we obtain:
U (cH) −
h









We therefore have the following implication of s = T :
λ(T) ≤ mH( ˆ W,cH), (10)
where we deﬁne mH(W,c)=
U(c)−U0(c)c
f(W,c)−fc(W,c)c.
On the other hand, if s<T,the ﬁrst-order conditions imply that
λ(s)=mH(W(s),c(s)). (11)
13As the following proposition makes clear, when willpower has alternative uses perfect smoothing
need not occur no matter how large the stock of initial willpower:
Proposition 2 If perfect smoothing occurs, the following conditions must hold:
(1) fWfc − fcWf =0 ,f o rc =
¯ R
T , W ∈
h
ˆ W, ¯ W
i
, and
(2) m0( ˆ W) ≤ mH( ˆ W,cH).
Proof. If smoothing is perfect then c(t)=
¯ R
T , implying ˙ c =0and c(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0,T). Since




> 0, w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t
λ(t) > 0 for all t ≤ T. It then follows from (8) that perfect smoothing requires fWfc − fcWf =0
where f(·,·) and its partial derivatives are evaluated at c =
¯ R
T and any W ∈
h
ˆ W, ¯ W
i
. This




> 0, (10) requires
m0( ˆ W) ≤ mH( ˆ W,cH), conﬁrming condition (2) of the proposition.
By widening the domain of condition (1) and retaining condition (2), we can also obtain a
suﬃcient condition for perfect smoothing to occur:
Proposition 3 The following conditions are suﬃcient for perfect smoothing:
(10) fWfc − fcWf =0 , for all c(t) > 0,W∈
h
ˆ W, ¯ W
i
, and (2) from Proposition (2),
Proof. To show that conditions (10) and (2) imply perfect smoothing, assume they do not. Perfect
smoothing could fail to occur for two reasons: varying consumption or constant consumption
terminating at s<T.Since (10) is assumed to hold, consumption must be constant. If it terminates
at s<T,then c =
¯ R
s >c H. Since less restraint will be exercised over a shorter interval W(s) > ˆ W>
0. This in turn has two implications. Since more willpower will be bequeathed to the alternative
activity, m0( ˆ W) ≥ m0(W(s)). In addition, since W(s) > 0, (7) implies that λ(s)=m0 (W(s)) > 0.
By hypothesis, s<T.Then, as shown above, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply λ(s)=mH(W(s),c).
Since mH(·,·) is weakly increasing in the ﬁrst argument and strictly increasing in the second
argument, mH(W(s),c) >m H( ˆ W,cH). Given the hypothesis that s<Twe therefore conclude
that m0( ˆ W) ≥ m0(W(s)) = λ(s)=mH(W(s),c) >m H( ˆ W,cH). But m0(W(s)) >m H( ˆ W,cH)
violates condition (2). Hence, (10)a n d( 2 )a r es u ﬃcient for perfect smoothing.
In the benchmark case where willpower has no alternative uses, perfect smoothing occurs when-
ever feasible. Characteristics of the willpower technology (f(W(t),c(t))) play no role. In contrast,
whenever willpower has any alternative use, the consumer abandons perfect smoothing unless the
willpower technology satisﬁes condition (1). Recall the example of Section 2.1. If K0(W) < 0
and A 6=0 , perfect smoothing always occurs when feasible if willpower has no alternative use but
never occurs–no matter how large the initial stock of willpower–when there is any other use of
14willpower. In cases where condition (1) in Proposition (2) fails, consumption increases or decreases
over time as summarized by equation (8).
3.3 Rich vs. Poor: How a Diﬀerence in “Cake” Size Alone Alters Intertemporal
Behavior
Unless condition (1) of Proposition 2 holds, there can be no perfect smoothing when there
are alternative uses of willpower. To see some surprising implications of this result and to clarify
the importance of condition (2), we conclude with an example where condition (10)a n da fortiori
condition (1) hold. In that case, perfect smoothing must occur when condition (2) holds and must
not occur when condition (2) fails. We will give two interpretations of our example. In the ﬁrst,
the cake is interpreted as wealth; in the second it is interpreted as a stock of leisure. Under the ﬁrst
interpretation, we see from this example that behavioral diﬀerences between rich and poor people
sometimes attributed to diﬀerences in self-control skills may reﬂect wealth diﬀerences and nothing
more.
Suppose two agents, one poor the other rich, have the same willpower technology (f = K(¯ c−c)).
Notice that this technology satisﬁes condition (10) and hence condition (1). Proposition (1) indicates
that optimal consumption paths are constant for both rich and poor as long as consumption is
strictly positive. Perfect smoothing occurs if and only if s = T.
Assume the rich agent has more cake than the poor but the two are identical in every other
respect: same preferences over consumption proﬁles, same initial endowment of willpower, same
willpower technology, and same bequest function. To simplify further, assume their bequest func-
tions are linear with slope m
To distinguish whether a variable pertains to the poor or the rich agent, we append a subscript
“p”o r“ r”, respectively. Thus, for consumption we write ci (for i = p,r). Because, in this example,
each agent has the same utility function and self-control technology, the function mH(·,·) is identical
for each and there is no need to add the subscript i.
Assume that, for i = p,r, m > mH( ˆ Wi,c H,i) in violation of condition (2). Then, by Proposi-
tion (2), the optimal consumption path can not involve perfect smoothing. Since consumption is
constant and exhausts the cake, si <Tand ci >c H,i, for i = p,r.
Since, by assumption, both the rich and the poor carry some willpower into the second activity,
additional willpower must have the same marginal utility in the two activities and, from (7),
λi(si)=m. However, since si <T, (11) requires that λi(si)=mH(Wi,c i). Hence,
mH(Wi,c i)=m for i = p,r. (12)
Since the left-hand side of (12) is independent of its ﬁrst argument and strictly increasing in its
15second argument, this equation deﬁnes the same consumption for the two types of agent: cp = cr as
long as both consumptions are positive. Since the poor agent has a strictly smaller cake ( ¯ Rr > ¯ Rp),
he must run out of cake sooner (sp <s r), after which his consumption drops to zero. Having started
with the same willpower and having exercised the same restraint over a shorter time interval, the
poor agent will have more willpower remaining to invest in alternative activities: Wp(sp) >W r(sr).
Consider what happens if the initial cake size of the rich agent is expanded. The larger the
initial cake size, the longer the interval of constant consumption and the smaller the bequest. When
t h ec a k es i z eo ft h er i c hr e a c h e s ¯ Rr = Tcp,m= mH( ˆ W,cp) and condition 2 is no longer violated.
Further increases in the initial cake size, require cr =
¯ Rr
T >c p and since mH is strictly increasing
in its second argument, m<m H( ˆ W,cr). Since condition 2 holds in this region, perfect smoothing
must occur. Further increases in the initial cake size cause faster but constant consumption over
the entire horizon. Hence in this region willpower remaining at T becomes an increasing, instead
of a decreasing, function of the initial cake size.
Interestingly, if we compare the behavior of the poor and the rich, in this region where remaining
willpower is increasing in cake size, it appears as though the rich agent is more disciplined. He not
only does a better job smoothing consumption, he also has more willpower left to expend on, say,
exercise or diet regimes. In fact, the rich agent is endowed the same intertemporal preferences, the
same self-control technology, and the same willpower stock as the poor agent. In this example, the
poor agent seems less disciplined simply because he is poor.
We can reinterpret this example for the case where the cake represents leisure. Consider agents
obligated to complete tasks of diﬀerent sizes on or before T. Those agents with lighter workloads
are, therefore, “richer” in leisure. If an agent’s workload is suﬃciently light, he may work at a
light but steady pace throughout the horizon, consuming leisure at a constant pace as well. A
larger workload will require him to work harder and consume leisure at a slower but constant rate
over the entire time horizon. Once the workload exceeds some threshold, however, the optimal
program has two phases. Until time s<T,the agent works at a steady pace and consumes leisure
at a constant rate as well; after s, the agent works relentlessly without any leisure breaks. Further
increases in the workload do not alter the rate at which the agent works in the ﬁrst phase. Instead,
he shortens the phase during which he combines leisure and work and lengthens the phase when he
works relentlessly.
164 Willpower and Time Preference: Field Evidence and Compari-
son with Alternative Models of Self-Control
The standard discounted utility model has proved very useful in economics but, as noted in the
introduction, violations of the model seem common.11 One set of violations consists of present-
biased time preferences, intertemporal preference reversals, and tastes for commitment. Another
violation of the standard model is negative time discounting; sometimes people prefer increasing
sequences of consumption. Present-biased preferences, preference reversals and a taste for com-
mitment have previously been explained using models of self-control. Negative time preference
is usually regarded as a separate phenomenon re q u i r i n gas e p a r a t em o d e l . A sw eh a v es h o w n ,
however, willpower depletion can simultaneously explain present-biased preferences, intertemporal
preference reversals, a taste for commitment and preferences for increasing consumption sequences.
At the same time, our model accommodates previously unexplained links between (seemingly un-
related) self-control behaviors. Willpower depletion thus provides a more uniﬁed theory of time
preference.
We begin this section with a discussion of the empirical evidence that people often consume from
a ﬁxed stock at an increasing rate for intervals of time. We then demonstrate that this behavior is
inconsistent with prior models of self-control. Indeed models of costly self-control rule out perfect
consumption smoothing as well. We conclude this section by distinguishing our treatment of self
control as an endogenous shadow cost from prior treatments as an exogenous direct cost.
While consumption paths which decrease over time seem unremarkable, there is evidence that
agents sometimes prefer increasing sequences of consumption. See, among many examples, Loewen-
stein and Prelec (1993) on food and entertainment consumption, Frank and Hutchens (1993) on
wages, and Chapman (2000) on health outcomes. This evidence, drawn largely from responses to
hypothetical choice scenarios, is consistent with the seemingly common desire to “save the best for
last” when consumption is desirable or “get the hard part out of the way,” when the intertemporal
choice involves labor versus leisure.
These previous studies did not link preferences for increasing sequences of consumption to the
problems of self control that, as we have seen, can generate preferences for commitment, induce
profound procrastination, and create links between behavior in seemingly unrelated self-regulation
activities. Instead, these models of negative time preference focus on anticipation (time non-
separable) utility and on reference dependent preferences. Because they are not focussed on issues of
self control, the choice scenarios used in these studies do not emphasize whether the decision maker
11See Frederick, et al. (2002), for a recent review.
17is committed to the consumption path he has chosen.12 This issue of commitment is important
because, like all other models of self-control with time-separable utility, our willpower model predicts
perfect smoothing of consumption if the consume rc a nc o m m i tt ot h a tp a t ha ta n yt i m ep r i o rt o
the moment consumption begins. So, for example, with commitment and no subjective rate of time
discount, even a willpower constrained consumer would choose a perfectly ﬂat consumption path
from time 0 to time T.
There is, however, ﬁeld evidence of unambiguously uncommitted consumers choosing increasing
paths of consumption expenditure. Studies of high frequency data on individual expenditures in
Britain indicate that consumers sometimes choose intervals of increasing consumption between the
a r r i v a lo fp a y c h e c k s . 13 Both Kelly and Lanot (2002) and Huﬀman and Barenstein (2004) ﬁnd that
the non-durable expenditures of British consumers exhibit a U-shaped pattern over the course of
the four weeks between paychecks. (See, for example, their Figures 1 and 4, respectively). Such
behavior can never occur in the conventional model under certainty, with time-separable utility
and exponential discounting; nor can it result from allowing the conventional model to incorpo-
rate hyperbolic discounting. Models of anticipatory utility or reference dependent preferences can
accommodate increasing consumption paths, but cannot explain by themselves a taste for com-
mitment, or profound procrastination, or links between seemingly unrelated acts of self-regulation.
Kelly and Lanot (2002) attribute the U-shaped pattern of consumption expenditure to uncertainty
and precautionary saving within the pay period. Huﬀman and Barenstein (2004) attribute the
interval of apparently increasing average consumption to measurement error.14 As we have seen,
our model can explain these increasing sequences of consumption.
Although present in both experimental and ﬁeld data, increasing consumption sequences are
inconsistent with prior models of self control. The prior literature can be grouped into three
12The subjects in these studies are simply asked which sequence of consumption or income they prefer.
13There is also some, less statistically certain evidence of intervals of increasing consumption in high frequency
data on daily expendiure by US consumers. See Stephens (2003), Tables 2 and 3 for total expenditure and Figures
4c-4g for non-durable expenditures.
14The Family Expenditure Survey used in both studies asks respondents to record their expenditures in a diary for
two weeks. The day upon which the diary begins is randomly assigned. Public use data aggregate each household’s
expenditures by week. Researchers can identify whether a respondent is paid monthly and the date his last paycheck
arrived but not, precisely, the date of his next check. Therefore, diary weeks that begin 25 days or more after the last
check arrived will typically include expenditures from at least one day after the next check has arrived. If consumption
is higher on days just after the check arrives, this measurement error may explain the higher levels of consumption
in diary weeks that began 25-30 days after the last check arrived (see Huﬀman and Barenstein, 2004, Figure 4). This
error would not seem to explain, however, the increase in average expenditure between weeks starting 21 (perhaps
17) and 24 days after the last check. Neither can this measurement error explain why average expenditure is often
higher in the third week after the arrival of the last check than it is in the second (Kelly and Lanot, 2002, Figure 1).
18strands. The ﬁrst focuses on the present-biased choices which result from (quasi-) hyperbolic time
discounting; the second models self-control problems which arise from temptation costs; the third
models self-control problems which derive from internal conﬂicts between multiple “selves,” one
a long-run self which may, at a direct utility cost, exert control over the choices of a sequence
of short-term selves. Models with hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
1999) do not explain strictly increasing consumption since the impatience posited would always lead
to larger immediate consumption and smaller consumption later. Demonstrating that dual self-
models (Thaler and Shefrin, 1988; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006) and models with temptation costs
(Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004a,b; Benhabib and Bisin, 2004; Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini,
2005) do not explain the preference for increasing consumption sequences requires a more detailed
investigation.
Consider a ﬁnite-horizon, undiscounted version of Fudenberg-Levine’s saving model and assume
no growth. Although they restrict attention to a speciﬁc functional form of the utility function
and the cost function, we consider the more general case where utility is any strictly increasing and
strictly concave function and cost is any strictly increasing and weakly convex function, each twice
diﬀerentiable. Then in the Fudenberg-Levine model the single-agent chooses (c1,...,c t) to maximize
T X
t=1
{u(ct) − g(u(Rt) − u(ct))} subject to Rt+1 = Rt − ct and R1 = ¯ R, (13)
where ct ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 0 and ¯ R>0 and we assume that the utility function u(·) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave and the cost function g(·) is strictly increasing and weakly convex. As before
¯ R is the size of the cake, and Rt is the remaining cake in period t. To show that ct+1 ≥ ct can
never occur in their model, we verify that it would always violate the ﬁrst-order condition for this
problem. Assuming diﬀerentiability, the following condition must hold at an optimum:
u0(ct)·[1+g0(u(Rt)−u(ct))]−u0(ct+1)·[1+g0(u(Rt+1)−u(ct+1))]+u0(Rt+1)[g0(u(Rt+1)−u(ct+1))] = 0
(14)
The ﬁnal term of (14) is strictly positive since it is the product of two strictly positive factors. As
for the other two terms, they would combine to something weakly positive, violating condition (14)
whenever ct+1 ≥ ct.15 Weakly increasing consumption sequences are, therefore, inconsistent with
Fudenberg-Levine’s model.
15To see this, note that each term is the product of two factors. If consumption is weakly increasing the ﬁrst factor
of the ﬁrst term (u
0(ct)) is weakly larger than its counterpart (u
0(ct+1)). Moreover, the argument of g
0 in the ﬁrst
term is also strictly larger than its counterpart in the second term: u(Rt)−u(ct) >u (Rt+1)−u(ct+1) since the cake
remaining will be strictly smaller and consumption at t+1will be weakly larger. Since g is assumed weakly convex,
the ﬁrst product of two factors must weakly exceed the second product of two factors and hence these terms make
the left-hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition even more positive.
19For similar reasons, weakly increasing consumption sequences are inconsistent with Gul-Pesendorfer’s
model. In the ﬁnite horizon, undiscounted version of their problem the agent maximizes:
T X
t=1
{[u(ct)+v(ct)] − v(Rt)} subject to Rt+1 = Rt − ct and R1 = ¯ R, (15)
where ct ≥ 0 and Rt ≥ 0. Both the u and v functions are assumed to be strictly increasing. To
insure concavity of the objective function, the u is assumed to be strictly concave, v is convex
and u + v is strictly concave. It is straightforward to verify that this formulation insures strictly
decreasing consumption.16 Intuitively, an agent smoothing consumption between adjacent periods
can always do better by marginally redistributing consumption to the earlier of the two periods.
This perturbation in consumption has no ﬁrst-order eﬀects on the sum of utilities of consumption in
the two periods while strictly reducing the uneaten cake and hence the temptation cost. Thus, their
model also predicts strictly decreasing consumption. In contrast, increasing consumption sequences
can arise in a model with willpower depletion because the same amount of self-control is less costly
in terms of willpower expended if it is exercised when the willpower stock is larger. Hence, there is
an incentive to exercise more self control in the earlier of two periods (“use it or lose it”).
We conclude by distinguishing our treatment of self-control as an endogenous shadow cost
f r o mt h et r e a t m e n ti nt h ep r e v i o u sl i t erature as an exogenous direct cost.17 Presumably there are
circumstances in which the classical model predicts well. After all, it has served as the canonical
model for decades. It is, therefore, an attractive feature of any new model supplanting a classical
one that it include the classical model as a special case and that the circumstances in which the
classical results hold are predicted endogenously. Other models of self-control do not have this
feature; there are no circumstances under which they collapse to the classical model and predict
consumption smoothing over time.18 In contrast, if willpower depletion is appended as a constraint,
16The ﬁrst-order condition is [u
0(ct)+v
0 (ct)] − [u
0(ct+1)+v
0 (ct+1) − v
0(Rt+1)] = 0. Given that u + v is strictly
concave and v is strictly increasing, the ﬁrst-order condition can only be solved by a strictly decreasing consumption
sequence.
17In discussing an appropriate formulation to capture Baumeister’s experiments, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2004) regard the exertion of willpower as generating disutility although Loewenstein (2000) regards the matter as
an open question. Whether or not willpower depletion has a utility cost seems diﬃcult to resolve empirically. What
we have resolved analytically, however, is that including the stock of willpower (or its rate of change) in the utility
function is not necessary to capture either the behaviors psychologists have documented in their laboratories or to
explain a number of prominent “anomalies” behavioral economists have reported in the ﬁeld. For these purposes, it
is suﬃcient to append to the conventional formulation of intertemporal utility maximization the additional constraint
that the consumption path chosen must not overexhaust the agent’s willpower.
18Of course (β − δ) models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting nest the standard model (when β =1 ). However, this
nesting derives, exogenously, from unobserved preferences rather than endogenously from changes in observable
20there will be circumstances (e.g. large stocks of initial cake or willpower or a short horizon) in which
perfect smoothing does not violate the constraint and will be optimal.
5 Extensions of the Intertemporal Model
In the previous sections we have assumed that willpower is simply depleted by its use and
that the agent always knows his stock of willpower with certainty. In this section, we discuss the
consequences of relaxing each assumption.
5.1 Self-Control Builds Willpower Like a Muscle
Common intuition and some experimental psychology indicate that willpower may be like a
muscle: controlling visceral urges depletes willpower over the short term, but the regular exercise
of self-restraint may eventually build willpower. Indeed, there is some evidence that willpower can
be built up in one domain and then used to advantage in other arenas (Muraven et al., 1999 and
Muraven and Baumeister, 2000).19 In this section, we consider how allowing willpower to be built
through its exercise may aﬀect the optimal consumption paths described in the previous sections. Of
particular interest is an understanding of when the ability to build willpower reinforces and when it
counteracts the incentives for increasing paths of consumption we observed in previous sections. Our
analysis indicates that the ability to build willpower through its exercise may introduce variation
in consumption rates over time even when willpower concerns alone do not. Because the analysis
of this extension is more technical, we relegate details to Appendix B.
To evaluate the eﬀects of buildable willpower, we introduce a third state variable, muscle, the
level of which is denoted by M (t). We augment our earlier model in two ways. First the rate
of change of willpower is now given by ˙ W (t)=γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t)). As before, willpower is
depleted by restraining consumption, f (W (t),c(t)), but this depletion is moderated by the service
ﬂow γ from the stock of muscle, M (t). Since the stocks of willpower and muscle cannot jump,
the only way to alter the rate of willpower depletion immediately is by altering contemporaneous
consumption. In the future, however, muscle may be developed by the previous exercise of willpower
and this muscle provides additional willpower at rate γ. We assume, for simplicity, that the rate at
which muscle develops (or deteriorates) is given by ˙ M = f (W (t),c(t))−σM (t). The idea is that
exercising willpower today contributes to one’s future muscle but the contributions decay.
features of the environment.
19In one experiment (Muraven et al., 1999), subjects who participated in two-week self-control drills (regulating
moods, improving posture, etc.) later showed signiﬁcant increases in the length of time the would squeeze a handgrip
relative to those who did not participate in the drills.










γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t)) if R(t) > 0





f (W (t),c(t)) − σM (t) if R(t) > 0
−σM (t),o t h e r w i s e
(17)
R(t) ≥ 0,W(t) ≥ 0,M (t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0,T] (18)
R(0) = R>0,W(0) = W>0,M (0) = M>0.
The optimal consumption path in this muscle model shares some qualitative features with that
in the model without muscle. First, the cake is entirely consumed. Second, for every initial level of
muscle there is a willpower level W ˜ H above which the optimal path entails perfect smoothing. This
is true because, for every initial stock of muscle there is an initial stock of willpower suﬃciently
large such that the Hotelling path is feasible and therefore optimal.20 If we start with an initial





where any further reduction in the initial stock of willpower will make the
perfectly smooth path infeasible.
Next, we ask how allowing buildable willpower alters our previous conclusions about the time
path of optimal consumption in the absence of discounting (ρ =0 ). As in the model with out
muscle, on the optimal path the sum of the direct and indirect marginal beneﬁts of increased
consumption must remain equal to the marginal cost of that consumption (having a bit less cake
for the future). Hence, if consumption is strictly increasing over time, which would depress the
direct marginal beneﬁts of consumption, then the indirect marginal beneﬁts must also be strictly
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where ∆ =[ U00 (c) − (λ − π)fcc] < 0, λ is the costate associated with the law of motion for willpower
and π is the costate associated with the law of motion for muscle. That is, λ(t) is the shadow value
of willpower at time t and π(t) is the shadow value of muscle at t. Note that if λ(t)=π(t)=0for
20Indeed, if the initial muscle level is large enough, the agent will be able to achieve perfect smoothing without any
initial willpower.
22t ≥ 0, equation (19) yields the classical result that consumption is constant as long as it is positive
and indeed the ﬁrst order conditions will require that it be positive until T.
To clarify how muscle building inﬂuences the time path of optimal consumption when perfect
smoothing is infeasible, we consider two special cases where, in the absence of muscle, the optimal
consumption path is particularly simple. Speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁrst the case where the rate of
willpower depletion is determined only by rate of consumption and not by the willpower remaining
(fW =0 ) , and second the case where (fWfc − fcWf)=0 . In each of these cases, when muscle is
absent, optimal consumption is constant until some time s when consumption drops to zero. In
other words, willpower concerns alone would induce no time preference except at the point when
the cake (and willpower) is depleted entirely.
Referring to equation (19), case 1 (fW =0 )implies that both the direct willpower eﬀect and
the muscle service ﬂow are absent. The time path of consumption is therefore determined only by
muscle building. First consider the case where muscle decays at a faster rate than it contributes
to willpower [(γ/σ) ≤ 1]. In this case, the muscle building term of equation (19) is always positive.
Thus when (γ/σ) ≤ 1 and fW =0 , consumption is always increasing. Relative to the optimal path
in the absence of muscle, the ability to build willpower through its exercise leads the agent to bear
down at the beginning of the program in order to enjoy a greater willpower later.
When muscle decays more slowly [(γ/σ) > 1], more complex consumption paths may emerge.
Depending on initial conditions, optimal behavior may have the same qualitative features as when
(γ/σ) ≤ 1. Consumption is always increasing. In other circumstances detailed in Appendix B,
however, consumption will decrease with time and later increase. That is, the consumption proﬁle
is ∪ - shaped.
Referring again to equation (19), case 2 [(fWfc − fcWf)=0 ]implies that only the direct
willpower eﬀect is inactive. Relative to the optimal path in the absence of muscle, the ability to
build of willpower with exercise again induces time preference. Consider, for example, a situation
where the initial muscle stock is zero (M (0) = 0), and thus, at the beginning of the program, the
muscle service ﬂow term is inactive. In the beginning of the program, optimal behavior in this case
is like that in the case where fW =0 . For example, when (γ/σ) ≤ 1, consumption will increase
in these early stages of the optimal path. Thus we see in each of these cases that the ability to
build willpower through its exercise induces a time preference for consumption even when willpower
concerns themselves do not.
235.2 Depleting a Stock of Willpower of Unknown Size
Loewenstein (2000) points out that an agent may not be a good judge of the willpower he has
in reserve. He may in retrospect ﬁnd that he overestimated his self-control resources or he may
be pleasantly surprised to have more willpower than he anticipated and discover that he has “a
second wind.” Gilbert (1979), among others, has addressed a similar issue when there is a single
depletable resource. His analysis can easily be adapted to the case where the agent knows his cake
size but not his initial reserves of willpower.
A two-state example will clarify the basic ideas. Suppose an agent has one of two initial
stocks of willpower and assigns positive probability to each state. Assume that the agent has no
alternative use of willpower (m(W)=0 ) and that even the larger stock of willpower is insuﬃcient
to implement perfect smoothing. Assume that that fW =0so that consumption is constant when
strictly positive.
If the agent knew that his willpower stock was low, he would conserve it by consuming at a
rapid, constant rate and would deplete his cake quickly, after which he would have nothing left to
consume until the end of the horizon. Denote as sl t h ed a t ew h e nh ew o u l de x h a u s th i sc a k ei fh e
was sure his initial willpower stock was low. Similarly, denote as sh(>s l) t h ed a t ew h e nh ew o u l d
exhaust his cake if he was sure his initial willpower stock was high. Suppose, however, that the
consumer could not observe his willpower reserves directly. Then, whatever consumption path he
chooses, he would obtain no information about his initial willpower stock until the date when his
willpower would have run out if his initial stock had been small. At that point, he could infer the
size of his initial reserves: if he loses control because he has no more willpower, then his initial
reserves were small; if he retains control because he has more willpower, then his initial reserves
were large.
Under uncertainty of this kind, it is optimal to consume at a constant rate intermediate be-
tween the alternative consumption rates he would choose under certainty. Since this would involve
restraining his consumption more than is optimal if he was certain his willpower stock was low, he
would run out of willpower sooner in the event that his is initial stock was in fact low. If we denote
as sul the date when he would run out under uncertainty if his initial stock of willpower was in fact
low, then sul <s l. In that event, lacking willpower reserves to control his consumption, he would
exhaust the remaining cake at the rate ¯ c and then would have nothing left to consume until the
end of the horizon.
On the other hand, if at sul the agent discovered that he still had the ability to restrain
consumption, then he would rationally conclude that his initial willpower stock had been high.
Since he had been consuming at a faster rate than if he had known this state from the outset, he
24would ﬁnd himself at s+
ul with more willpower and less cake. In this circumstance, the consumer
would take advantage of this “second wind” by restricting his consumption below the constant rate
he would have chosen if he had known from the outset of his high reserves of willpower.
6 Linkages Between Contemporaneous Activities Requiring Willpower:
Controlling Unhealthy Behaviors
Our analysis has so far focused on the intertemporal allocation of willpower. Of course, at
any given time, an individual also needs to allocate willpower among various activities requiring
self-control. This intratemporal allocation problem is a natural one when the capacity for self-
regulation is scarce. The existing models of self-control do not speak to this issue because they do
not consider fungible capacities for self-restraint.
In this section we consider the implications of the optimal, intratemporal allocation of willpower
across competing activities with an application to health investments. A simple model of optimal
intratemporal willpower allocation predicts that, among the willpower constrained, the correlation
of health-related activities such as smoking, drinking, and overeating will be negative. Trading
oﬀ current consumption and future health, those with a binding willpower constraint focus their
limited powers of self-control on activities (such as quitting smoking) with the greatest eﬀect on
future health. This attention to certain activities comes at the expense of others that require
self-regulation. Thus when most in the population are willpower constrained, contrary to the
predictions of a standard health investment model, and consistent with ﬁeld evidence described
below, the correlation of health-related behaviors may be low.
A recent study by David Cutler and Ed Glaeser (2005) documents a surprising fact: the cor-
relation of diﬀerent health-related behaviors across individuals is remarkably low. Using multiple
sources of U.S. data, Cutler and Glaeser show, for example, that smokers are not much more likely
to be heavy drinkers; heavy drinkers are no more likely to be obese, and the obese are no more
likely to avoid taking recommended medications.21
Cutler and Glaeser go on to show formally that this low correlation of health-related behaviors is
incompatible with a standard economic model where the substantial diﬀerences in levels of healthy
behavior are attributed largely to individual heterogeneity in investment factors. Speciﬁcally, in
the context of a standard but quite ﬂexible model, Cutler and Glaeser show that low correlation of
health-related behaviors requires relatively little variation in subjective rates of time discount and
21In National Health Interview data from 1990 the highest correlation of these behaviors is between smoking and
drinking (ρ =0 .16). See Cutler and Glaeser (2005), Table 1.
25in the value of life.22 This implication of the standard formulation is troubling since diﬀerences
in age alone should theoretically generate considerable variation in the value of a statistical life
(Kniesner et al., 2006) and the variation in subjective rates of time discount is typically estimated
to be substantial (see, e.g., Warner and Pleeter, 2001, and Harrison et al., 2002).
If most people are willpower constrained, however, the low correlation in health-related behav-
iors can be explained even if there is a substantial variation in the value of life. To simplify, suppose
people exert self control in two health-related activities and have either a high or low value of life
and either a high or a low willpower endowment. Assume some people are always willpower con-
strained. Among such people, those that have the higher value of life will exert more self control
in one activity but that requires them to relinquish self control in the other activity; therefore,
among this group the correlation of self-control activities is -1. Assume other people have so much
willpower that they are never constrained (as in the conventional model). Among such people,
those that value life more will exert more self control in each activity; therefore, in this group
the correlation of self-control activities is +1. Aggregating over both groups, the correlation of
self-control activities can be anything between -1 and +1, depending on the relative representation
of the two groups in the population. To illustrate, we construct an example below in which the
correlation is smaller than 10−3; and yet this low correlation is achieved with a variance of the
value of life of exceeds 106.
The following example appends a willpower constraint to the Cutler-Glaeser model. In our for-
mulation, a1 and a2 represent self-control activities that reduce enjoyment of consumption (reduce
























j is an individual-speciﬁc return to action j, πi
j is the self perceived eﬀect of action j on the
survival probability, βi is the individual-speciﬁc discount rate, Vi is the value of survival, ¯ Wi is the
22Cutler and Glaeser’s investment model also shows that that the low correlation of health-related behaviors is
incompatible with substantial variation in cross-behavior tastes for healthy activities. In other words, there are no
“healthy” or “unhealthy” types of people whose behavior is driven by their general tendency to enjoy or to dislike
healthy activities.
23These decisions can be transformed to consumptions which are unhealthy but enjoyable by a simple change of
variable: for example, cj =¯ xj − aj, where xj is a constant and cj is consumption of j. The correlation between
transformed variables, c1 and c2, w i l lb et h es a m ea sb e t w e e na1 and a2.
26individual-speciﬁc willpower stock and Ki
j is the per unit willpower cost of action j. All of these
variables are potentially stochastic and independent of each other.
Suppose the value of life Vi is 7,000 with probability 0.39 and 10,000 with complementary
probability. Similarly, available willpower ¯ Wi is either 51 or 100. Suppose further that βi =0 .8,
bi
1 =3 0 ,b i
2 =1 0 ,K i
1 = Ki
2 =1 ,π i
1 =0 .01 and πi
2 =0 .00625 for all individuals i. The example has
been constructed to reﬂect a familiar tradeoﬀ.A c t i v i t y1 is particularly distasteful, but particularly
good for future health. The other activity is less unpleasant, but also contributes less to future
health. The following table lists the optimal choices where the ﬁrst entry is the optimal choice for
a1.
Low Willpower High Willpower
Low Value of Life 26,25 26,25
High Value of Life 30.5,20.55 0 ,40
In this example people with high willpower are unconstrained even if they value life highly. People
with low willpower have just enough willpower to implement the same self control actions when
they have a low value of life, but are forced to choose a point on the same willpower constraint
when they have a high value of life (Figure 3). If the probability of low willpower is 0.979 the
correlation between a1 and a2 is smaller than 10−3 w h i l ev a r i a n c eo ft h ev a l u eo fl i f ee x c e e d s106.
Thus, a low correlation in health-related behaviors is consistent with substantial variation in the
value of life, as willpower constraints induce, in a large group of people, a negative correlation of
healthy activities.
The example we constructed above is robust to the introduction of alternative uses of willpower.
If willpower also has (current or future) uses that do not aﬀect health, then an individual who
values life highly could withdraw willpower from these alternative activities. This would relax
his willpower constraint and it would then be feasible to increase both health-related activities.
However, it could still be preferable to increase one health-related activity and reduce the other.
Intuitively, the optimal response to an increase in the value of life can be decomposed into (1) the
change in the two health-related activities if the willpower allocated to them did not increase and
(2) the additional change in these two activities when willpower is reallocated to them from the
alternate activity. This latter eﬀect will be negligible, however, if the marginal utility of willpower in
the alternate activity declines with suﬃcient speed (if the bequest function is suﬃciently concave).
The two health-related activities will then move in opposite directions, just as in our example.
277C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has explored the consequences of including in a conventional model of intertem-
poral choice a cognitive constraint well-documented by experimental psychologists. Speciﬁcally,
we assumed that if an agent restricts his consumption, then exercising self-restraint depletes his
ﬁnite stock of willpower. This willpower constraint captures the common notion, consistent with
laboratory experiments, that an individual has a limited, though positive, capacity to regulate his
own impulsive behaviors.
To study how a binding willpower constraint aﬀects choices over time, we introduced it in the
simplest intertemporal model, where an agent decides how to consume a cake (or paycheck or stock
of leisure time) over a ﬁxed time period. With suﬃcient willpower, an agent perfectly smooths,
consuming cake at a constant rate (in the absence of discounting) until the end of the planning
horizon.
If the agent lacks the willpower to implement this program, however, his willpower acquires
scarcity value and his optimal response is to behave in ways that might seem anomalous and
which the prior self-control literature has sought to explain. Speciﬁcally, a consumer subject to
a binding willpower constraint exhibits a taste for commitment, an apparent present bias, and
a tendency for profound procrastination. Moreover, he displays other anomalous behaviors that,
although well-documented, are inconsistent with existing models of self control. For example, prior
cognitive loads aﬀect his subsequent conduct because they reduce the stock of willpower he can use
to regulate his behavior. Moreover, an agent in our model may increase his consumption over time
because exercising self control later, when his stock of willpower is reduced, requires more willpower
than exercising the same self control earlier. Finally, a willpower constrained consumer regards
seemingly unrelated activities as linked since he uses the same cognitive resource to exercise self
control in diﬀerent activities. This linkage has important implications. If willpower has alternative
uses besides restraining consumption (e.g. cramming for exams), the agent may never smooth
consumption regardless of his initial willpower.
We considered two extensions of the intertemporal model. First, we investigated what would
happen if current exercise of self control, while immediately depleting willpower, also builds willpower
reserves in the future. We found that renewable willpower induces a time preference even when
consumption would have been constant if willpower had been nonrenewable. Second, we considered
the possibility that the decision maker is uncertain about his stock of willpower. We found that
the agent would optimally consume at a higher rate as a hedge against the risk of running out
of willpower and, if surprised to infer that he has larger willpower reserves, experiences a “second
wind” that permits further self-discipline later on the optimal path.
28Finally we extended our analysis to the intratemporal problem of allocating of willpower across
competing self-control activities, with an application to health-related investments. The intratem-
poral allocation problem is a natural one when willpower is ﬁxed in supply. Because they do not
consider fungible capacities for self-restraint, however, the existing models of self-control do not
speak to this issue. Our analysis showed that when most in the population are willpower con-
strained, contrary to the predictions of a standard health investment model, and consistent with
ﬁeld evidence (Cutler and Glaeser, 2005), the correlation of health-related behaviors may be low.
That willpower is scarce and depletable accords with both introspection and experiment. To
explore how this constraint aﬀects intertemporal behavior, we appended it to the canonical model
of intertemporal choice. To our surprise, we found that the augmented model accounts both for
prominent anomalies of intertemporal choice that have been the focus of the self-control literature
and for other anomalies that were unaddressed by that literature and which have instead been
treated as altogether separate phenomena requiring separate models. Scarcity of willpower also
aﬀects intratemporal behavior as well. To illustrate, we appended a willpower constraint to the
standard model of health investment and discovered that variations in willpower endowments may
explain the anomalous low correlation in contemporaneous health-related activities noted by Cutler
and Glaeser (2005). Given that taking account of willpower depletion is so tractable and illumi-
nating, future research should clarify experimentally the form of the willpower depletion function
and should embed that function as a constraint in other economic models.
29Appendix A: The Equivalence of Solving Problems P1 and P2
Here we show that by solving the problem in which the date when consumption ceases is a
choice variable (P2), we in fact solve our original problem (P1). In problem (P1), the optimal
consumption path either ﬁnishes the cake at time t0 <T ,or it does not. If the cake is exhausted
at time t0 <T ,then the law of motion governing the depletion of willpower jumps to zero, and
for any time t ∈ (t0,T], ˙ W (t)=c(t)=0 . These same paths of consumption and willpower could
be achieved in problem (P2)b yc h o o s i n gs = t0, and would generate the same payoﬀ. Similarly, if
in the original problem (P1) the cake is not exhausted before time T (R(t) > 0 for t<T), these
p a t h so fc o n s u m p t i o na n dw i l l p o w e rc o u l da l s ob ea c h i e v e di nt h er e l a t e dp r o b l e mb yc h o o s i n g
s = T, and would generate the same payoﬀ. Since the two problems share objective functions and
laws of motion up to time s = t0, any program that is feasible in the original problem is also feasible
in the related problem and will generate the same payoﬀ.
Given that any consumption path that is feasible in problem (P1) is also feasible in problem
(P2), if the optimal consumption path in problem (P2) is feasible in problem (P1)t h e ni ti sa l s o
optimal in problem (P1).24 As u ﬃcient condition for any consumption path in problem (P2)t o
be feasible in problem (P1) is that the consumption path depletes the cake by time s (R(s)=0 ).
After all, that consumption path generat e st h es a m ew i l l p o w e rp a t hu pt ot i m es in both problems
and therefore W (t) ≥ 0 up to time s. After time s in problem (P1), willpower remains constant
(at W (s)) since the cake is depleted. Hence any such consumption path is feasible in problem (P1)
as well.
To see that the optimal consumption path in (P2) exhausts the cake at time s, suppose the
contrary–that the “optimal” program leaves R(s) > 0 cake uneaten at s. To dominate this program,
consider a diﬀerent program that duplicates the “optimal” consumption path up to time s − ∆,
for any ∆ > 0, and consumes
R(s)
∆ more during the remaining interval of length ∆.T h i se x h a u s t s
the cake, draws willpower down to the same level at s − ∆ and depletes less willpower during
(s − ∆,s). Indeed, one can always choose ∆ small enough that
R(s)
∆ ≥ ¯ c. In this case, depletion of
willpower during (s − ∆,s) ceases altogether. Not only would utility from the alternative activity
be weakly larger than on the “optimal” path but utility from intertemporal consumption would be
strictly larger. This follows since the alternative consumption path is uniformly higher throughout
and strictly higher from time s − ∆ to s. This contradicts the claim that any feasible path with
24To see this, suppose that the optimal consumption path in problem (P2) is feasible but not optimal in problem
(P1). Then there is a strictly preferred consumption path that is feasible in problem (P1). But by our earlier
argument this path is also feasible in problem (P2) and would dominate the program we claimed was optimal in
problem (P2) .H e n c ew eh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
30R(s) > 0 can be optimal. Hence, without loss of generality, we can conﬁne our attention to problem
(P2).
Appendix B: When Willpower May be Built Through Its Exercise:
Details
Again we consider a related but more tractable problem and argue that, by solving it, we solve
problem (P3). In the related problem, the agent chooses both an optimal consumption path c(t)
and the date s ≤ T after which consumption ceases, where ˙ W (t)= ˙ M (t)=c(t)=0for all





subject to the constraints of problem (P3) except constraints (16)-(18) which are replaced by:
˙ W (t)=γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t))
˙ M (t)=f (W (t),c(t)) − σM (t)
R(t) ≥ 0,W(t) ≥ 0,M (t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0,s].
As in the problem without muscle, to show that this tractable problem has the same consump-
tion path for t ∈ [0,s] as the solution to the actual problem (P3), it suﬃces to show that in problem
(P4) the entire cake is consumed by t = s in the optimal solution. To see this note that if R(s) > 0
in the optimal program then M(s) > 0 and W(s) ≥ 0. But then we could choose ∆ small enough
that
R(s)
∆ ≥ ¯ c. We could then duplicate the proposed optimal path until s − ∆ and augment it by
R(s)
∆ in this ﬁnal interval. The payoﬀ would be strictly higher and the program would be feasible
since the willpower left at s−∆ is the same in the two programs (W(s−∆) ≥ 0) and no willpower
is depleted in the ﬁnal interval.
Having established that the solution of our related problem (P4) solves the actual problem
(P3), we make two observations which simplify the analysis. First, since the muscle is initially
positive and decays exponentially even if it is never augmented, muscle will be strictly positive
and will at no time violate the nonnegativity constraint. Second, since the stock of cake can only
decline, requiring that it is nonnegative at s insures that it will be nonnegative previously.
Given that for t ∈ [0,s) t h e s et w os t a t ev a r i a b l e sm u s tb enonnegative, we can simplify our
formulation by replacing R(t) ≥ 0 and W (t) ≥ 0 by R(s) ≥ 0 and W (s) ≥ 0. However, since
W(s) ≥ 0 no longer implies that W(t) ≥ 0 for t<s , the conditions which must necessarily hold at
an optimum whenever W(t) > 0 will diﬀe rf r o mt h o s et h a th o l dw h i l eW(t)=0 . Given our focus,
31we consider only the former situation in detail.25 The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
H (c(t),R(t),W(t),t,α(t),λ(t),π(t))
= e−ρtU (c(t)) − α(t)c(t)+λ(t)(γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t)))+
π(t)(f (W (t),c(t)) − σM (t)).
The ﬁrst order conditions are given by,
c(t) ≥ 0, e−ρtU0 (c(t)) − α(t) − (λ(t) − π(t))fc ≤ 0 and c.s. (20)
˙ W (t)=γM (t) − f (21)
˙ M (t)=f − σM (t) (22)
˙ α(t)=0 (23)
˙ λ(t)=fW (λ(t) − π(t)) (24)








T − s ≥ 0,H (c(s),R(s),W(s),s,α(s),λ(s),π(s)) ≥ 0 and c.s. (26)
W (t) > 0 and c.s. (27)
R(s) ≥ 0,α (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (28)
W (s) ≥ 0,λ (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (29)
M (s) ≥ 0,π (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (30)





F i r s ta s s u m et h a tγ/σ ≤ 1. In this case, we show that each of the preceding terms is weakly positive
while ˙ λ and ˙ π are weakly negative. These results can be most readily understood using the phase
diagram depicted in Figure 1. Provisionally assume that fW < 0 and γ>0. Then we can plot the
locus of (λ,π) pairs such that ˙ λ =0 .B yt h e˙ λ equation (24), these points lie on the 450 line π = λ.
Horizontal motion above this locus is to the right and below it is to the left. Similarly, we can plot
the locus of (λ,π) pairs such that ˙ π =0 .B yt h e˙ π equation (25), these points lie on a ﬂatter ray
provided
γ
σ < 1. In the extreme case where
γ
σ =1 , the two rays coincide. Vertical motion above the
˙ π =0locus is upward and below this locus it is downward. As long as muscle exists at any time in
25To derive conditions which must hold across both cases, Seierstad and Sydsœter (1987), and also Léonard and
Long (1992)) begin by forming the Lagrangean H +Θ(t)W(t), where Θ(t) is a Lagrange multiplier. In such problems
the multiplier (λ) on the state variable (willpower) may jump discontinuously as the nonnegativity constraint is just
reached or as it becomes slack. If that multiplier does jump, then consumption would jump as well at such dates.
32the program, some will remain at the end (M(T) > 0), because it at most decays exponentially and
therefore never reaches zero. It follows from condition (30) that the endpoint condition π(T)=0
is satisﬁed. As long as willpower considerations matter (λ(0),π(0) 6=0 ), the endpoint condition
and dynamics preclude initial multipliers set ato ra b o v et h el o w e ro ft h et w or a y ss i n c et h e n˙ π ≥ 0
implying π(T) > 0. Thus π(T)=0requires that the initial multipliers be set below the lower of
the two rays. But this in turn implies that λ − π>0,
γ
σλ − π>0, ˙ λ<0, and ˙ π<0.
Now consider the case where γ/σ > 1, depicted in Figure 2. The endpoint condition π(T)=0 ,
together with these dynamics imply that there will be a ﬁnal phase in which the multipliers will lie
strictly below the ˙ λ =0locus, and thus, again, λ − π>0,
γ
σλ − π>0, ˙ λ<0, and ˙ π<0.
To see that the optimal consumption path in the muscle model involves consuming the entire
c a k e ,n o t et h a th a v i n ga s s u m e dU0 (·) > 0 and fc < 0, and shown (λ − π) > 0, we can satisfy (20)
only if α>0; and then (28) requires that the cake be exhausted by time s. To see that, if we start
with an initial level of willpower suﬃcient for perfect smoothing, decreases in that stock eventually




where any further reduction in the initial stock of willpower will make
the perfectly smooth path infeasible, note that since λ(0) ≥ 0, we know that utility is increasing
in the initial stock of willpower. Because perfect smoothing is the optimal path in the absence of
willpower concerns path, it follows that such a path is infeasible for any W (0) <W˜ H.
Finally, we turn to the time path of optimal consumption in the absence of discounting (ρ =0 ).
Diﬀerentiating condition (20), we obtain:
U00 (c) ˙ c = ˙ α +
³
˙ λ − ˙ π
´
fc +( λ − π)
³
fcc˙ c + fcW ˙ W
´
=( fW (λ − π) − (πσ − λγ))fc +( λ − π)
³
fcc˙ c + fcW ˙ W
´
=( λ − π)
³
fWfc + fcc˙ c + fcW ˙ W
´





(λ − π)(fWfc − fcWf)
∆
+
muscle service ﬂow z }| {














where ∆ =[ U00 (c) − (λ − π)fcc] < 0. The inequality follows because c maximizes the Hamiltonian.
If λ(t)=π(t)=0for t ≥ 0, equation (31) yields the classical result that consumption is constant
as long as it is positive and equation (26) requires that it be positive until T.
Referring to equation (31), if fW =0then both the direct willpower eﬀect and the muscle service
ﬂow are absent. First consider the case where muscle decays at a faster rate than it contributes
to willpower [(γ/σ) ≤ 1]. In this case, the muscle building term of equation (31) is always positive
(see Figure 1) and the associated discussion). Thus when (γ/σ) ≤ 1 and fW =0 , consumption is
always increasing.
33When muscle decays more slowly [(γ/σ) > 1], more complex consumption paths may emerge.
If the multipliers λ and π are initial located in regions II or III of Figure 2, optimal behavior has
the same qualitative features as when (γ/σ) ≤ 1. Consumption is always increasing. If, however,
the multipliers are initially located in region I of Figure 2, consumption will decrease with time
until the multipliers pass into region II. That is, the consumption proﬁle is ∪ - shaped.
Referring again to equation (19), if (fWfc − fcWf)=0then only the direct willpower eﬀect is
inactive. Relative to the optimal path in the absence of muscle, the ability to build of willpower
with exercise again induces time preference. Consider, for example, a situation where the initial
muscle stock is zero (M (0) = 0),and thus, at the beginning of the program, the muscle service ﬂow
term is inactive. In the beginning of the program, optimal behavior in this case is like that in the
case where fW =0 . For example, when (γ/σ) ≤ 1, consumption will increase in these early stages
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Figure 3: Controlling Unhealthy Behaviors with Diﬀering Values of Life and Willpower
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